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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Moises Gomez appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his 
guilty plea to sexual abuse of a minor child. On appeal, Gomez argues the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his post-sentencing motion for 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. He also argues the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 1999, then 26-year-old Gomez sexually abused a close family friend, 
14-year-old S.B., while S.B. and her family were attending a family reunion at 
Lava Hot Springs. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Gomez escorted S.B. to her room and, once 
there, told S.B. he was going to give her a massage. (PSI, p.3.) At Gomez's 
direction, S.B. lay on the bed and Gomez massaged her neck and back. (PSI, 
p.3.) "After a short time, [Gomez] instructed [S.B.] to turn over on her back and 
lay with her legs slightly apart." (PSI, p.3.) As Gomez continued massaging 
S.B., he lifted up her shirt and sports bra, "plac[ed] his hands firmly around each" 
of her exposed breasts, and rubbed them in a circular motion for several 
minutes. (PSI, p.3.) Gomez then worked his way down S.B.'s torso, placed his 
hands under her pajama bottoms and massaged her thighs and "the outer area 
of her vagina." (PSI, p.3.) Gomez "continued massaging [S.B.'s] vaginal area[,] 
using larger strokes around the labia minora, labia majora and clitoris." (PSI, 
p.3.) S.B. "was frightened to the point she couldn't tell [Gomez] to stop, but 
when he massaged her vaginal area continuously, she found the courage to tell 
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him she felt uncomfortable with his massaging." (PSI, p.3.) "At that point, 
[Gomez] removed his hand from her underwear and replied, 'just once more," 
then placed his hands back inside her underwear and continued stroking her 
vaginal area with his hand." (PSI, p.3.) He stopped when his infant son began 
crying in the next room. (PSI, p.3.) The next day, Gomez approached S.B. from 
behind, "wrapped his arms around her torso, squeezing her to his body," and 
"whispered to her that he was sorry." (PSI, p.3.) 
For years, S.B. did not tell anyone what Gomez had done to her. In July 
2011, Gomez contacted S.B. and told her "he had confided with his LDS Stake 
President about what he did to her at Lava Hot Springs" and, as a result, was 
"disfellowshipped from the church." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Following that contact, S.B. 
reported the abuse to law enforcement. (PSI, pp.2-4.) During a "slam call," 
Gomez repeatedly admitted to having touched S.B.'s breast while giving her a 
massage when she was 14 years old, but he denied any memory of having 
touched her vagina. (PSI, p.4; Psych. Eval., p.2.) 
The state charged Gomez with one count of sexual abuse of a child under 
the age of 16 years and one count of lewd conduct with a child under 16. (R., 
pp.17-18.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Gomez pied guilty to sexual abuse of 
a minor under the age of 16 years; in exchange, the state stipulated to the 
dismissal of the lewd conduct charge and, contingent on a finding by the 
psychosexual evaluator that Gomez posed a low risk to reoffend, agreed to 
recommend that Gomez be placed on probation. (R., pp.39-48, 50-52.) 
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In October 2012, the psychosexual evaluator submitted a report in which 
he opined that, at a minimum, Gomez posed a "moderate-low risk' of sexually 
reoffending. (Psych. Eval., p.13 (emphasis original).) The evaluator also stated 
that, due to Gomez's inability to produce a nondeceptive full disclosure 
polygraph examination, "I am not recommending community placement for Mr. 
Gomez." (Psych. Eval., p.14.) The presentence investigator concurred with the 
evaluator's conclusions and recommended a period of retained jurisdiction. 
(PSI, p.13.) The presentence investigator also noted that Gomez was "not a 
legal resident and [would] be subject to removal proceedings upon completion of 
his sentence in this matter." (PSI, p.13.) 
After the presentence report and psychosexual evaluation were prepared, 
but before sentencing, Gomez filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., 
pp.58-61.) Gomez subsequently withdrew the motion, and the case proceeded 
to sentencing. (R., pp.64-71.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
eight years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.66-71.) 
Before the period of retained jurisdiction expired, Gomez filed a second 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Augmentation: 6/12/13 Motion To Withdraw 
Plea of Guilty ("Motion").) As the basis for his motion, Gomez asserted, for the 
first time, that at the time of his plea colloquy, he "spoke only limited English" and 
"did not understand and was not properly informed of the immigration 
consequence of his plea." (Motion, p.2; see also Augmentation: 7 /16/13 
Affidavit.) Also for the first time, Gomez requested the assistance of an 
interpreter (Augmentation: 7 /9/13 Motion To Appoint Interpreter) - a request the 
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district court granted (Augmentation: 7/15/13 Minute Entry & Order; 7/15/13 Tr., 
pp.1-4). 
At a rider review hearing on July 22, 2013, the district court suspended 
the balance of Gomez's sentence and placed him on probation. (Augmentation: 
7/29/13 Minute Entry & Order; 7/22/13 Tr., p.5, L.3 - p.6, L.20.) The court also 
heard argument on Gomez's post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
(7/22/13 Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.14, L.3.) The court ultimately denied the motion, 
finding no manifest injustice because the record showed Gomez understood 
English and was told multiple times that he might be deported as a result of his 
plea. (Augmentation: 8/6/13 Decision On Motion To Set Aside Guilty Plea 
(attached hereto as Appendix A).) 
Gomez filed a notice of appeal, timely from both the original judgment and 
the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.74-78.) 
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ISSUES 
Gomez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Gomez's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. 
Gomez following his plea of guilty? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Gomez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea because 
Gomez failed to carry his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice 
entitling him to withdrawal of his plea? 
2. Has Gomez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon 
his guilty plea to sexual abuse of a minor child? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Gomez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
After he was sentenced, Gomez moved to withdraw his plea on the sole 
asserted bases that, at the time of the plea colloquy, he did not understand 
English and was neither informed nor aware that he could be deported as a 
result of his plea. (Motion, p.2.) The district court denied the motion, finding 
from its review of the record that Gomez both understood English and was aware 
of the potential immigration consequences of his plea. (8/6/13 Decision On 
Motion To Set Aside Guilty Plea.) 
On appeal, Gomez is "[m]indful of the fact that [he] stated on the record 
that he read and understood English, and responded 'yes' to this question in 
writing on the guilty plea questionnaire." (Appellant's brief, p.6; see also 
Appellant's brief, p.11.) He is also "mindful of the fact that both his counsel and 
the district court advised [him] that he could possibly be deported." (Id.) 
Nevertheless, Gomez continues to assert "that he did not understand the legal 
proceedings and did not understand that he could be deported if he pied guilty." 
(Id.) Gomez's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded that 
Gomez's claims are refuted by the record and, as such, Gomez failed to carry his 
burden of demonstrating any manifest injustice entitling him to post-sentencing 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 
941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial 
court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. 
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 
Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Gomez Failed To Show Any 
Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P .2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A 
court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only 
upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Flowers, 150 
Idaho 568, 571, 249 P.3d 367, 370 (2011); State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 
156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). 
The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty 
plea. "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered 
after a full trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 
796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The stricter standard also insures that the defendant 
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is not "encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and 
withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the 
burden of proving that the plea should be withdrawn. !.9.:_; State v. Gomez, 124 
Idaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656,657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Manifest injustice is established as a matter of law where a plea is "not 
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards." State v. 
Thomas, 154 Idaho 305, 307, 297 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2013); see also 
Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at 1195. Constitutional due process 
standards require "that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently," as shown by the "record of the entire proceedings, including 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Thomas, 154 Idaho at 307, 297 P.3d 
at 270 (citing I.C.R. 11 (c)); accord Flowers, 150 Idaho at 572, 249 P.3d at 371. 
In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum requirements of I.C.R. 
11(c) in accepting guilty pleas. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 
109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286, 
289 (Ct. App. 1989)). If the record indicates that the trial court followed the 
requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is 
voluntary and knowing. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824 P.2d at 111. However, 
'[t]he failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 does not, by itself, constitute 
manifest injustice." Flowers, 150 Idaho at 573, 249 P.3d at 372. As a matter of 
constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is "'entered by 
one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
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commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel."' Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). Because due process requires only 
that a defendant be advised of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, the trial 
court is not constitutionally required to inform a defendant of consequences that 
are collateral or indirect. Flowers, 150 Idaho at 573, 249 P.3d at 372 ("Prior to 
accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the defendant of the 
direct consequences of the plea."); Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 32 P.3d 672 
(Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted) ("[D]ue process only requires that a defendant 
be informed of direct, as opposed to collateral consequences of a guilty plea."); 
see also Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97-98, 156 P.3d at 1195-96 (citing State v. 
Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002); Ray v. State, 
133 Idaho 96, 99-101, 982 P.2d 931, 934-36 (1999)) (under I.C.R. 11(c), which 
establishes the minimum requirements for taking a constitutionally valid guilty 
plea, "[t]he trial court is not required to inform a defendant of consequences that 
are collateral or indirect"). 
In this case, Gomez moved to withdraw his plea based on his claims that, 
at the time he entered the plea, he did not understand English and was neither 
properly advised nor aware that he could be deported as a result of his plea. 
(Motion; 7/16/13 Affidavit; 7/22/13 Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.9, L.14, p.10, L.18 - p.12, 
L.20.) Whether the risk of deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a 
guilty plea is a matter of some debate. Compare Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 367 (2010) (United States Supreme Court expressed its view, in the context 
of resolving a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that 
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"[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close 
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct 
or a collateral consequence" of a guilty plea), with Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 
783, 291 P.3d 466 (Ct. App. 2012) (indicating that, for purposes of a due process 
analysis, the risk of deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, albeit 
one counsel is required to inform his client of in order to provide the professional 
assistance demanded by the Sixth Amendment); see also I.C.R. 11 (d)(1) (before 
accepting plea, court "shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is not a 
citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions 
could have consequences of deportation or removal ... "). This Court need not 
resolve the debate in this case, however, because even assuming, arguendo, 
that the risk of deportation is a direct consequence of which Gomez was required 
to be advised, the record in this case supports the district court's determination 
that Gomez was so advised and that he actually understood he could be 
deported as a consequence of his plea. 
In its order denying Gomez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district 
court applied the correct legal standards and set forth in detail the facts, drawn 
from the record, that demonstrate Gomez understands English and entered his 
plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and with knowledge of the 
consequences thereof, including the potential immigration consequences. 
Rather than repeat the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions, the 
state hereby adopts the district court's analysis, as set forth at pages 4 through 7 
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of the court's "Decision on Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea"1 (see Appendix A), 
and submits for the reasons recited therein that Gomez failed to establish any 
manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. 
11. 
Gomez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Gomez challenges the underlying unified sentence of eight years, with 
three years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to sexual abuse of a minor child. 
Specifically, he contends the sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating 
factors he claims are present in this case. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15.) A 
review of the record and the applicable law supports the sentence imposed. 
Gomez has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
1 The state does note that, in resolving whether Gomez was adequately informed 
of the risk of deportation, the district court erroneously stated that Gomez "pied 
guilty to sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age under 
I.C. § 18-1508A(1 )(a)." (Appendix A, pp.7-8.) In actuality, the record shows 
Gomez pied guilty to sexual abuse of a minor child under 16 years old. (R., 
pp.39-48; 7/23/12 Tr., p.2, L.7 - p.9, L.25.) The district court found the 
distinction "important" because sexual abuse of a minor child under 16 is an 
aggravated felony for which deportation is "presumptively automatic." (Appendix 
A, p.8.) The state disagrees with the district court's assessment and asserts the 
distinction is actually unimportant, at least in the due process context, because 
the record shows Gomez was advised multiple times that he might be deported 
and knew before he was sentenced that he was actually facing deportation due 
to his status as an illegal alien. (See R., p.47; 7/23/12 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.9; 
12/3/12 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.18, L.5; PSI, pp.9, 12-13; Appendix A, pp.5-8.) 
Whether Gomez's attorney had an obligation under the Sixth Amendment to 
provide him more comprehensive advice about the deportation consequences of 
his plea is a question not at issue in this appeal. (See Appellant's brief, p.1 n.2.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. FarweB, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. kl 
C. Gomez Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl 
The nature of Gomez's crime and his character shows there was no 
abuse of sentencing discretion. Gomez molested a 14-year-old girl whose family 
apparently entrusted her to Gomez's care during a trip to Lava Hot Springs. 
(PSI, pp.2-4.) The girl, S.B., was staying with Gomez and his wife and son in 
their cottage while the rest of S.B.'s family stayed in the "main house." (PSI, 
p.3.) On the first night of S.B.'s stay, Gomez escorted her to a bedroom and 
"massaged" her breasts and vaginal area underneath her clothes. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
When S.B. told Gomez "she felt uncomfortable with his massaging" Gomez 
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"removed his hand from her underwear and replied, 'just once more,' then placed 
his hands back inside her underwear and continued stroking her vaginal area 
with his hand." (PSI, p.3.) Gomez stopped "massaging" S.B.'s vaginal area 
when his son began crying in the next room, but he suggested to S. B. that she 
and he "should share the bed when he returned." (PSI, p.3.) When Gomez left 
the room, S.B. laid on the floor and pretended to be asleep. (PSI, p.3.) The next 
morning, Gomez woke S.B. up and told her to sleep in the bed. (PSI, p.3.) Later 
that evening, Gomez embraced S.B. from behind and "whispered to her that he 
was sorry." (PSI, p.3.) 
After Gomez sexually abused her, S.B. was afraid to tell anyone what had 
happened. (PSI, pp.4-6.) In the years that followed, and in an effort to keep up 
pretenses, S.B. continued to visit Gomez and his family, sometimes staying with 
them for up to a week at a time. (PSI, p.5.) During those visits, Gomez "would 
often say things or do things to make [S.B.] feel uncomfortable," including 
touching her and massaging her shoulders. (PSI, p.5.) He often told S.B. she 
was "his favorite" and that her skin was pretty and, occasionally, he told S.B. that 
if he had met her before he met his wife, he would have married S.B. instead. 
(PSI, p.5.) On the nights S.B. slept at Gomez's house, Gomez "would always 
find a reason" to go to the basement where S.B. was sleeping and talk to her; 
and "each night [S.B.] was afraid it [the sexual abuse] would happen again." 
(PSI, p.5.) As a result of having been abused by Gomez, S.B. has for years 
suffered from depression and experienced ongoing intimacy and trust issues that 
have adversely affected her relationships. (PSI, pp.4-6.) 
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Twelve years after he sexually abused her, Gomez contacted S.B. and 
told her "he had confided with his LOS Stake President about what he did to her 
at Lava Hot Springs. [He] also told her he was disfellowshipped from the church 
and had 'paid' his consequences." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Gomez apparently actually 
believed he had already suffered any consequences that were due as a result of 
having sexually abused S.B., as he repeated that sentiment in a recorded 
telephone conversation with S.B. in September 2011. (PSI, p.4.) During that call 
Gomez repeatedly admitted to having massaged S.B.'s exposed breasts when 
she was 14 years old, but he denied any recollection of having touched her 
vagina. (PSI, p.4.) 
Consistent with his statements to S.B. in the September 2011 "slam call," 
Gomez responses to questioning and testing by the psychosexual evaluator 
showed he "minimize[d] the seriousness of what occurred." (Psych. Eval., pp.2, 
6.) According to the evaluator, Gomez believed "the allegations against him 
[had] been exaggerated and state[d] that he did not know that what he did was 
all that wrong. (Psych. Eval., p.5.) He blamed others - including his spouse and 
parents - for his sexual offending, and he specifically blamed S.B. for his 
behavior in this case, "indicating that she appeared and acted older than her 
actual age, was 'loose' or easy, and that she wanted and liked the sexual activity 
that occurred." (Psych. Eval., p.6.) When asked by the polygrapher "what his 
intentions were on the night of the index crime," Gomez admitted he found S.B. 
"very attractive and it was his plan to see if things would develop to the point of 
intercourse, stating, 'I guess in the end, if fell [sic] into place, I hoped to have 
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sex."' (Psych. Eval., p.7.) Despite this admission, Gomez continued to maintain, 
in two separate polygraph examinations, that he did not recall ever touching 
S.B.'s vagina and never masturbated to sexual thoughts or fantasies of S.B. 
(Psych. Eval., p.10.) Gomez showed deception on both polygraphs, however, 
leading the psychosexual evaluator to conclude "[t]here is thus more to know 
about Mr. Gomez's actions vis-a-vis the index victim [S.B.].'' (Psych. Eval., 
pp.10-11.) 
Although Gomez denied having perpetrated sexual abuse on any other 
child, testing showed that, "by far, his strongest sexual interests are for well-
developed adolescent females, with much less - but still significant - sexual 
interest in adult females." (Psych. Eval, pp.6, 8.) This result is, at the very least, 
concerning because, at the time of the psychosexual evaluation, Gomez had 
been coaching a "girls' volleyball team, made up of older preteen and young teen 
females." (Psych. Eval., p.11.) He admitted "to having had sexual thoughts 
about two of the girls ... and having experienced brief masturbation fantasies 
about several of the girls, denying any ejaculation to these fantasies." (Psych. 
Eval., p.11.) As noted by the psychosexual evaluator, however, at the time of 
the evaluation Gomez had "yet to produce a nondeceptive polygraph record, 
leaving open the possibilities of direct abuse or simply fantasy and masturbation 
at a greater level than Mr. Gomez has thus far been willing to disclose." (Psych. 
Eval., p.11.) 
In the absence of a nondeceptive polygraph, the psychosexual evaluator 
was unable to definitively assess the risk Gomez poses to sexually reoffend. 
15 
(Psych. Eval., pp.11, 13.) Relying on other risk assessment tools available to 
him, the evaluator opined that, at a minimum, Gomez "poses a moderate-low risk 
for sexual offending and for more general criminal recidivism in the future." 
(Psych. Eval., p.13 (emphasis original).) Ultimately, however, the evaluator 
noted that Gomez's "risk level remains indeterminate," and he recommended 
that Gomez not be placed in the community. (Psych. Eval., pp.13-14 (emphasis 
original).) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the 
information and recommendations contained in the presentence report and 
psychological evaluation, as well as the four goals of sentencing. (12/3/12 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.12-16.) It also considered Gomez's request that he be placed on 
probation but declined to grant that request for two reasons. (12/3/12 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.13-14, 17-18.) First, the court was unwilling to send the message "that if 
you're in the country illegally and you commit a felony, all you have to do is get 
deported and there's no other punishment to the crime." (12/3/12 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.18-22.) Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court accurately 
observed that Gomez's polygraph results indicated "there is some deception still 
regarding the nature of this case and what he did in this particular circumstance." 
(12/3/12 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.2.) The court thus imposed a unified sentence 
of eight years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for the purpose of 
requiring Gomez to obtain sex offender treatment before he could be deported. 
(12/3/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-10.) 
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On appeal, Gomez does not contest any of the information upon which 
the district court relied in crafting his underlying sentence. Instead, he claims 
only that the court should have given greater weight to factors he deems 
mitigating, including his family support, employment history and purported 
remorse and acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15.) There 
can be no question that the district court was aware of these "mitigating factors" 
when it imposed Gomez's sentence. That the court did not assign these factors 
greater weight or elevate them above the need to protect society while at the 
same time providing Gomez an opportunity for structured rehabilitation does not 
show the sentence is excessive. Assuming Gomez is not deported, his 
underlying sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, is more than 
reasonable given the nature of his crime and his continued minimization of it. 
Gomez has failed to show an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence and the district court's order denying Gomez's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
DATED this 31 st day of January 2014. 
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Case No:CR~2011-0020165-FE 
DeCISION ON MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE GUILTY PLEA 
The Court sentenced Defendant Moises Gomez on December 3, 2012, on 1 count 
of Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age, in violation of I.C. § 
18-1508A(1)(a). The sentence is for a tern, of eight years with three years fixed followed 
by five years indeterminate. The Court retained jurisdiction for 365 days and sent Gomez 
011 a retained jurisdiction program. IDOC placed Gomez in the Sex Offender Retained 
Jurisdiction Program. Gomez did well on the retained jurisdiction program and this Court 
placed hirn on probation on July 22, 2013. However, the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) lodged a detainer against Gomez and he is subject to 
deportation. The detainer resulted in a hold against Gomez and he is still sitting in the 
Bannock County Jail awaiting seizure by ICl=. 
This matter oame before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Gullty Plea. 
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The Court held a healing on July 22, 2013. Doug Dyl<man appeared for and with the 
Defendant Moises Gomez. Zachery Parris, Bannock County Chief Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney appeared for the State of Idaho. The Court heard oral argument and then took 
the matter Linder advisement. Now, the Court issues this decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 12, 2012, the State flied a Pro$ecutlng Attorney's Information charging 
Defendant Moises Gomez with 1 Count Sexual Abuse of a Child under the Age of Sixteen 
Years In violation of LC. §18--1508(1)(b) and 1 Count Lewd Conduct with a Child under 
Sixteen In violation of I.C. § 18M1508. On ,July 23, 2012, Gomez pied guilty to 1 Count 
Sexual Battery of a Minor Child Sixteen or Seventeen Years of Age in violation of LC. § 
'18"1508A(1)(A). The State dismissed the 2nd count. The Court set sentencing for 
September 4, 2012. The parties twice stipulated to continue sentencing to allow time for 
the necessary evaluations to be completed, particularly a psychosexual evalllation with a 
full disclosure polygraph. 
Originally1 private counsel represented Gomez. That counsel withdrew his 
representation in writing on October 16, 2012, and the Court appointed a public defender 
to represent Gomez. The Court set sentencing for November 5, 2012. The public 
defender flied a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on November 5, 2012.1 The PSI Report 
was completed on October 29, 2012, and submitted to the Court, prosecutor, and prtvate 
counsel on that date. However, the public defender claimed neither he nor his client had 
seen the PSI as of November 5, 2012, which was the date for sentencing. The Court 
1 This motion gave no grounds for the motion other than it was beh1g done pursuant to J.C. § 19-1714 and !CR 33. 
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continued the sentencing and set the sentencing and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea for 
hearing on November 13, 2012. On November 13, 20·12, Defense counsel asked for 
another continuance and the Court continued the matter.2 
On November 26, 2012, the defendant, In open court, withdrew his Motion to Set 
Aside Guilty Plea and asked to proceed with sentencing at a later data. The Court set 
sentencing for December 3, 2012. A sentencing hearing occurred on December 3, 2012, 
and the Court sentenced Gomez to three years fixed followed by five years indeterminate 
and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. Gomez appealed his sentence, particularly the 
order for retained jurisdiction, on January 10, 2013.3 
Mr. Gomez did very well on his retained jurisdiction program and received an 
Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (APSI) that recommended probation. 
On May 13, 2013, new private counsel substituted into this case as counsel for 
Gomez in place of the Bannock County Public Defender's Office. The Court set a Rider 
Review Hearing for May 28, 2013. The new private counsel appeared at that hearing with 
Gomez and requested a two week continuance. The State did not object so the Court 
continued the Rider Review Hearing until June 10, 2012. On June 10, 2012, Defendant 
again asked for a continuance so that he could file several motions. Again, the State did 
not object to a continuance so the Court continued the matter. Gomez remained 
Incarcerated throughout these continuances. 
2 Both defense co,msel and Gomez were awate at this poim that the PSI Report was recommending a retained 
Jurisdiction and that ICE was planning to depon Oomcz.. The Court believed that Gomez was a flight risk due ro 
the$c facts, lllld revoked Gomez's OR release and placed him injall until sentencin!. 
3 The Supreme Coun has stayed that appeal pending the outcome of Defendant'$ 2n Motion to Wltl1draw Guilty 
Plea. 
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On June 12, 20131 Gomez filed another Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (2nd 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea). This motion, for the first time, suggested that Gomez 
spoke only limited English and was not Informed of the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea. However, the new private counsel also flied a Motion for Permission to 
Withdraw as counsel on June 12, 2013. The Court held a hearing on June 24, 2013, at 
which defense counsel argued his motion to withdraw as counsel. The State made no 
objection and the Court granted the motion to withdraw as coun$el. A new publlc 
defender, Douglas Dykman, outside the Bannock County Public Defender's Office was 
appointed to represent Gomez. 
On July 9, 2013, Mr. Dykman filed a motion to appoint Interpreter and set this 
motion for hearing. The Court held the hearing on July 15, 2013. Over the State's 
objection, the Court appointed an interpreter and set the Rider Review Hearing for July 22, 
2013. Gomez then set his 2nd Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea for that same date, July 221 
2013. On July 22, 2013, the Court placed Gomez on probation for a period of 8 years and 
took the 2nd Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea under advisement.4 
DISCUSSION 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will be granted only to 
correct manifest injustice. s If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due 
process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
4 Despite being placed oil ptobatlon, Gomez remains incnrcerated l.n the BaDDock County Jall on an lCE bold. 
s ICR 33(c); Stale v. Thomas, 154 Idaho 305, 297 P.3d 268 (Ct.App. 2013). 
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intelligently, then n1anifest injustice is established as a rnatte, of law.6 However, a prima 
facie showing of compliance with due process standards is made when the minimum 
requirement$ of ICR 11 have been met.7 That rule provides that when the trial court 
accepts a guilty plea, the record of the entire proceedings, lncll1dlng reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, must show that the defendant was Informed of the consequences of his 
plea, and other direct consequences which may apply.8 
Here, at the change of plea hearing, the parties submitted a written plea agreement 
signed by Gomez. In that agreement, Gomez acknowledges that he speaks and reads the 
English language fluently, that he enters his guilty plea voluntarily, and that his counsel 
has reviewed all aspects of the charge against him including all possible legal defense$. 0 
The Court and Gomez then went through a colloquy in open court regarding the 
requirements of ICR 11 and in which Gomez acl<ncwledged, among other things, that he 
reads and understands the English language, that he has no mental disease, illness or 
disorder, that he waives his constitutional rights by pleading guilty, that he is not a United 
States citizen, that there is a possibility of deportation due to his guilty plea, and that he 
has an obligation to register as a sex offender. The Court then required Gomez to 
complete a Guilty Plea Questionnaire before he left the courtroom. In that questionnaire, 
Gomez again acknowledged the existence of all requirements of ICR 11, Including, that he 
could read and write the English language and that as a noncitizen he ran the risk of 
I 6 Thomas, 154 IdahOf at 307. 
7 Id, 
'ICR 11 (c){2); Thomas, at 307. 
9 Sea, Plea Agreement, tiled July 23, 2012, p. 4, para. IX. 
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deportation. At sentencing, Gomez knew that ICE had a deportation hold on him and that 
even if he received probation he would not be released from jail because of that hold. He 
is in the States illegally and would be deported even without a crime having been 
committed. There ls a prlma facle showing of compliance with due process standards. 
Despite all of the above, Gomez now claims that he does not speal< English well, 
he does not read English at all, and he needs an interpreter to help him understand what 
is being said. He further claims that because of the lack of an Interpreter at all stages up 
until his rider review hearing. he did not understand the risk of deportation. 
Gomez has submitted several affidavits or writings to the Court. Some are 
notarized as being under oath. All appear to be in the same handwriting. All are in fluent 
English. He appeared in open Court In several hearings and spoke English and properly 
answered all questions put to him, using complete sentences and not just "yes" or "no" 
responses. He gave a statement at sentencing without the aid of an interpreter, again 
using fluent English. There Is no indication in the record that he had trouble doing his PSI 
interview, psychosexual evaluation, or full-disclosure polygraph in English. In fact, the 
psychologist who performed the psychosexual evaluation noted that Gomez reads English 
at a "fairly adequate level" and-speaks "fairly good English".10 While on his retained 
Jurisdiction program, Gomez obtained his GED and completed several workforce 
readiness classes including first aid, fire, ladders/scaffold, lockout, office safety, tool, 
hazmat and food handlers. He completed a community model program in which he 
served as the assistant senior coordinator. There is nothing In the APSI to suggest that 
10 Despite this facr, a couple of the tests were performed In Spanish. 
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Gomez had trouble with the English language while on his Rider. 
courts are constantly called upon to decide, from conflicting evidence, what is fact. 
That, Indeed, Is their daily fare. They usually have no firsthand knowledge of what Is fact-
who really had the green light, whether It was the defendant who actually shot the victim-
but, to perform their' public role as adjudicator, they are empowered to declare what is fact 
from the evidence presented to them and to enter Judgments based upon those 
declarations, whether implicit or explicit. Here, the facts are straight forward and many are 
within the firsthand l<nowledge of the Court. Gomez speaks and understands English. He 
reads and writes English. The facts that he proceeded throughout the legal process 
without an interpreter, he communicated to the Court in word and writing in English, and 
only belatedly asked the Court for an Interpreter demonstrate hi$ ability to comprehend 
English, both spo!<en and written. Manifest justice does not require the Court to grant 
Gomez's motion on the basis of his new claim that he doesn't understand English. 
Even If Gomez understands English fluently, there is still the issue of whether he 
was adequately informed of the risk of deportation. Gomez. is not a legal resident. He is 
no longer married to a U.S. citizen. He has no right to be in this country. He can be 
deported even in the absence of a felony conviction. 11 He pied guilty to sexual battery of a 
minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age under LC.§ 18-1508A(1)(a). This crime has 
these elements: 
1. A defendant who is at least five years olde, than the victim; 
2. A victim who is 16 or 17 years old; 
3. A defendant who intends to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust1 passion, or 
11 s use§ 1221. 
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sexual desires of themselves, the victim, or a third party; 
4. A defendant who; 
a. commits any lewd or lasciviou$ act upon the vlctirn; 
b, solicits the victim to participate in a sexual act; 
i"66S P.009/010 F-217 
c. causes or has sexual contact with the victim not amounting to lewcl 
conduct; or 
d. makes any photographic or electronic recording of the victim. 
Gomez did not plead guilty to lewd conduct or to sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen. This distinction is important because the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
shows that Lewd Conduct with a Minor under ·16 and sexual abuse of a minor under the 
age of sixteen Is "sexual abuse of a minor" for purposes of that Act and therefore an 
aggravated felony. An aggravated felony makes deportation presumptively automatic. 
Any person not a citizen of the United States who Is convicted of an aggravated felony 
must be advised that he will be deported rather than that he simply may be deported. 
Gomez does not fall within that category because his crime Is not an aggravated felony. 
There Is no question that Gomez was told multiple times that he might be deported. 
There Is no question that he understood English enough to know what he was being told. 
There is no question that ICE had contacted him before he was sentenced. Gomez knew 
he risked deportation before sentencing. Even if he didn't, his deportation was going to 
occur with or without a conviction. The motion to set aside guilty plea ls denied. 
DATED this 6 14 day of August, 2013. 
• •
..-:;~------> 
e:. ~~- ~~·-/ 
. -----------~--- =::-;:::::~ ti?_-::;_.;.,,~ 
DAVIDC. NYE 
District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY tha~ on the ~ day of August,. 20131 l served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals In the 
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